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ABSTRACT
Most existing literature in the field of international relations on the hegemonic dimension of
nuclear technology is written from a realist, western perspective within the context of the Cold
War. It focuses on its military, defense, and security dimensions, non-proliferation and safety,
and some analyses of hegemony from a cultural media perspective. This theory-building paper
offers contrasting understanding of nuclear hegemony, which recognizes three recent
developments: 1) diminished Western Hegemony in nuclear technology; 2) growing Chinese
nuclear capacity in energy geopolitics; and 3) growing concerns about global energy security.
This paper begins with an overview of these developments and a review of the current state of
literature on the concept of nuclear hegemony. The paper then reviews the research
methodology employed by the author to interrogate conventional understandings of nuclear
hegemony. A discussion section then identifies the extent to which current thinking on nuclear
hegemony reflects current geopolitical realities. This section includes a proposed new
definition of nuclear hegemony. The paper concludes by examining the implications of this
study and recommendations for application and further study.
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OVERVIEW
Recent global developments such as the crisis in Ukraine have been sobering
reminders of the threat of global energy insecurity. As Budinger & Bauman (2022) recently
stated, “the Russian invasion of Ukraine has underscored the importance of energy
independence and reliability.” Beyond the immediate impact of rising energy costs, the lack
of capacity for states to produce their own energy has impacted many other sectors of society,
from health to food security. (Benton et al., 2022; Ori, 2022; Phoumin, 2022)
While some scholars and experts project that this crisis will accelerate the global
transition to renewable energy (Fetzek, 2022; Psaropoulos, 2022; Tharoor, 2022), there is
concern that despite the growth of the renewable energy sector, growing global demand will
not be met. (Hosseini, 2022; Lopez, 2015; World Nuclear Association, 2021) The
International Energy Agency (2021) projects that best-case scenario, renewable energy will
only be able to meet half of the global energy demand in the upcoming years. Additionally,
with climate-exacerbated drought and flooding threatening hydroelectric output worldwide,
(Bernstein et al., 2021; Dong et al., 2018; Hiar, 2021) the argument for including nuclear
energy in diversification strategies by the International Atomic Energy Agency and other
energy agencies is receiving more attention. (El Baradei, 2007) Clifford (2022) likewise
argues that the urgency of reducing carbon emissions, which is being compounded by
Russia’s reduction of natural gas flows Europe, has increased the appeal of nuclear energy.
Even Japan, in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima accident, is pursuing nuclear energy, with
Minister for Economy, Trade, and Industry Koichi Hagiuda stating in 2021, “Nuclear power
is indispensable when we think about how we can ensure a stable and affordable electricity
supply while addressing climate change.” (Nikkei Asia, 2021) Sadiq et al. (2022) likewise
note that “Nuclear energy has the potential to play an influential role in energy transition
efforts that are now [sic] anticipated by many countries.”
1

Many states in the non-western aligned Global South are in various stages of
implementing nuclear power in their energy programs. Sadiq et al. note that a significant
increase in nuclear power will be required to sustainably realize human development while
mitigating the effects of climate change. Some developed nations are likewise reconsidering
their plans to abandon nuclear energy. (Budinger & Bauman, 2022; Caballero-Anthony &
Trajano, 2015; Goldemberg, 2009; Pombo-Van Zyl, 2021) Citing recent initiatives to
construct nuclear reactors in South Carolina and Georgia, Feldman (2017) argues that a
“rebirth of commercial nuclear power” is potentially underway in the United States. He notes
several reasons for the U.S.’s renewed interest in nuclear energy, including the volatility of
energy commodities, environmental protection, and the projected increase in electrical
demand, which is expected to grow by 28% by 2040, according to the U.S. Department of
Energy. (2017)
On a global scale, nuclear energy is “already playing a role in energy geopolitics”,
(U.S. Senate, 2019) characterized by the “decline of U.S. nuclear export competitiveness”
(Nakano, 2020) over the last two decades while Russia and China have been aggressively
pursuing nuclear exports. Sallee (2021) notes that with minimal uranium production, an aging
nuclear reactor fleet, and diminishing technological and professional capacity, the U.S. “has
relinquished its competitive global position as the world leader in nuclear energy to Russian
and Chinese state-owned enterprises.” According to Mazarr et al. (2018) of the RAND
Corporation, Russia’s “energy diplomacy” of supplying technology and nuclear fuel, and
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes a strong emphasis on nuclear energy
exports, are evidence not only of Russia and China’s emergence as key players in the energy
landscape but also a renewed global focus on nuclear energy. Sallee argues that the U.S.’s
withdrawal from the global nuclear energy market has created a power vacuum in which
rivals such as Russia and China are in a capacity to fill, with alarming implications for
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foreign policy. Poneman et al. are more blunt, declaring that the U.S. “has lost its leadership
– and is on the precipice of losing it permanently.”
The potential of nuclear energy to help combat climate change and mitigate the
challenge of what is likely to be a global energy crisis (Gilbert et al., 2021; Helman, 2022;
Horowitz, 2021; Zakaria, 2021), and China and Russia’s move to fill the power vacuum left
by the western retreat from this sector represent a critical dimension of the dramatically
shifting geopolitical landscape.
Therefore, within the theoretical framework of a renewed competition for geopolitical
dominance between nuclear states driven by a global energy crisis, this paper aims to
contribute to the existing body of knowledge on nuclear energy by answering the question:
“What is Nuclear Hegemony?” and developing a working definition that can be used in future
research. It is hoped that this definition will assist in gauging how emerging dominant states
will leverage their nuclear prowess over their allies and competitors, how that power will be
accepted and challenged by other states, and how the interaction of these actors will shape
international relations.

POSITIONALITY
The underlying foundation and motivation for this paper are that while the world must
transition away from fossil fuels, the current capacity of renewable energy to meet global
energy needs, especially as the current instability in Ukraine constrains natural gas flows to
Europe, is insufficient. Therefore, incorporating nuclear energy is crucial for combating
climate change and achieving greater security.
My positionality is inspired by Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose discussion on nuclear energy I attended
at the Annual Graduate Institute Alumni Reunion in Geneva in 2021. At that discussion,
Director General Rossi emphasized that while nuclear energy will not solve the current
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climate crisis, it is an integral part of a practical energy diversification strategy to reduce
carbon emissions.
The European energy crisis, driven by diminished Russian natural gas supplies amidst
the Ukraine conflict, and observing, close-up, the need for reliable, affordable, and adaptable
low-carbon energy solutions while studying in Africa further solidified my conviction that
nuclear power will become an increasingly important source of global energy. My intent here
is not to necessarily advocate for or against nuclear energy. However, the ways in which the
trajectory of hegemonic influence and power in global nuclear energy governance are being
influenced by Russia and China’s advances in nuclear technology absent western capacity
and leadership are of great interest to me.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Despite the controversial nature of nuclear technology and the global concern over
proliferation and safety, as well as its potential for peaceful use, there are strikingly few
instances of the terminology “Nuclear Hegemony” in existing literature. Most research on
nuclear power and hegemony is written from a western, realist, Cold War perspective
(Deudney, 2014) that focuses on its military and security applications. Hayes (1988), for
example, one of the few scholars who actually uses the term, defines “Nuclear Hegemony” as
“an international political-military system in which nuclear weapons and strategy play a
central role in the military power, institutions, and ideologies which underlie that order.” His
analysis focuses primarily on the defense and military dimensions of nuclear technology,
which reflect the traditional realist foundation of Schurmann’s (1974) Political-Military
Hegemony Theory. However, he also acknowledges the complementarity of Cox’s (1981,
1987) liberal-oriented Political-Economy Hegemony theory and thus conceives Nuclear
Hegemony as a fusion of the two theories. Tomotsugu (2016) substantiates that latter theory
by emphasizing American use of nuclear cooperation as a diplomatic tool to augment its
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allies’ capacity to deter its Communist adversaries and contain the spread of nuclear weapons
technology to other undesirable actors.
Although Hayes (2018) goes on to further clarify the fusion of realist and liberal
approaches by characterizing Nuclear Hegemony as “American nuclear leadership” that is
based on both its superior nuclear arsenal and a “shared vision of liberal international order”,
he reiterates the underlying aim of “strategic nuclear deterrence aimed at containing illiberal
states, most importantly the former Soviet Union.”Sechser & Furhmann (2013) likewise
employ a traditional realist approach to nuclear technology and power, stating that “nuclear
weapons allow states to protect their territorial sovereignty and autonomy through deterrence
rather than more traditional security strategies, including defense, power projection, and
compellence.” More recently, Bin (2018) revisits the hegemonic use of nuclear weapons
during the Cold War to rebuff the Trump administration’s call for the need to counter the
perceived threat of China’s “Nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.”
Although he does not specifically use the term “Nuclear Hegemony”, Medhurst
(1997) offers a slightly more balanced analysis of American activities and aspirations during
the “Atoms for Energy” campaign, noting that it had military/security, economic, diplomatic,
and psychological dimensions. Ultimately, however, he concludes that with security and
defense being the primary goal of U.S. military policy, as well as “the nuclearization of
NATO forces”, the “peaceful” atom and American nuclear energy diplomacy were nothing
more than public relations campaigns to divert public attention away from its military uses.”
Citing the gradual scaling down of nuclear power projects during high oil prices during the
1970s, Gonzalez (2013) more bluntly argues that the U.S. nuclear energy efforts were nothing
more than an attempt to “solidify its hegemonic position.” Logically, he theorizes, the energy
shock should have been an impetus to intensify the development of nuclear energy

5

production. But the fact that nuclear projects were, in fact, reduced indicates that energy
security was not a priority in the U.S.’s nuclear ambitions.
The second prevailing line of thinking concerning Nuclear Hegemony concerns
disarmament and non-proliferation. In analyzing India’s No First Use (NFU) policy on
nuclear weapons, Kamath (2013) frames “Nuclear Hegemony” as an American global
institution that must be abandoned under the encouragement of NATO within the greater
context of the disarmament of the five major nuclear weapons states. Kamra (2009)
compliments this perspective, defining Nuclear Hegemony as an effort by “Nuclear Haves”,
which Gonzalez (2018) identifies as the Western, U.S.-led “political elite” to use Nonproliferation to prevent the acquisition and manufacturing of nuclear weapons by undesirable
“Nuclear Have Nots”. He points to the hypocrisy of nuclear states, which, while retaining and
refusing to destroy their own arsenals of nuclear weapons, promoted non-proliferation and
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which limited access of many countries to
nuclear technology.
Without specifically invoking the term “Nuclear Hegemony”, Ritchie (2019)
discusses a global nuclear order that revolves “around the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), nuclear deterrence, the possession and control of nuclear weapons and materials, and
nuclear abolition”, whose aim is to “delegitimize and stigmatize nuclear weapons and nuclear
deterrence through a new and unequivocal legal instrument under the auspices of the United
Nations”. Finally, Miller (2014) analyzes how dependence on American resources, coupled
with the threat of nuclear sanctions, projected American hegemony in non-proliferation
efforts and containment in the 1970s in Taiwan and Pakistan.
The third line of thinking frames Nuclear Hegemony through cultural and media
outlets, which are primarily oppositional narratives to nuclear war and devastation. Brink
(2018) analyses public criticism of “Nuclear Hegemony” in Japan in the wake of the
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Fukushima disaster through the publication of “senryu” (poetry) in Japanese media. The
“Nuclear power village”, which he describes as Japan’s “energy industry equivalent of a
military-industrial complex,” failed to foresee and later concealed the severity of effects that
the Tohoku earthquake had on the community.
Demo et al. (2014) focus on the role of the media in projecting the image of the
American nuclear elite, through which hegemony was “claimed” by America’s scientific and
technological prowess, and its nuclear endeavors legitimized and justified. They, therefore,
define Nuclear Hegemony as “the ongoing processes by which political, social, and cultural
forces combine to establish and enforce the dominant power of the nuclear-industrial
complex, which since the Manhattan Project in the 1940s has had power to command
resources, protect secrets, control publicity, and establish professional and political classes
and hierarchies of personal and institutional authority.” They briefly mention the U.S.’s
pursuit of a non-military international atomic program during the Truman administration but
maintain that it was essentially a public relations spin to manage the U.S.’s warmongering
image and assuage/divert concerns away from weaponization and destruction in order to
make it publicly acceptable.
Scholars such as Schwartz (2021) and Alexis-Martin (2019) frame the hegemonic
nature of nuclear technology within the devastation from nuclear testing on communities in
the Pacific Islands and the neo-colonial exploitation of uranium miners in Africa. Hogg
(2016) notes the emergence of “nuclear criticism” in popular culture in the 1980s in the
United Kingdom, which focused on the prospects of prolonged nuclear engagement as well as
the destructive capacity of nuclear technology that western Nuclear Hegemony fostered.
Despite these identifiable narratives, Deudney nonetheless notes that “extensive
literatures on hegemony and nuclear weapons…have surprisingly little overlap”. Beyond
these three narratives, many contemporary scholars (Harnisch, 2014; Horsburgh, 2015;
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Ritchie, 2019; Walker, 2012) acknowledge that power and hegemony have not received
sufficient consideration within the energy dimension of global nuclear governance.
This review of the existing literature has established that the academic framework to
evaluate and study the utility of nuclear energy as a diplomatic and hegemonic tool does not
exist. The geopolitical landscape continues to shift, most notably with the emergence of the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) organization, which is challenging
western hegemony. The hegemonic dynamic of nuclear power is also evolving as Russia
(Geller, 2022) and China emerge as global leaders in nuclear energy development and
exports. (Wang & Lee, 2022) To maintain global stability and security, compatible academic
and policy tools must also be developed
Existing narratives born out of Cold War realism continue to frame the discourse in a
profoundly different world order. Bin, for example, notes the alarmist view of nuclear
weapons confrontation that frames much of the current discourse on U.S.-China nuclear
relations. Ritchie notes a global nuclear “ordering anxiety” arising from the intersectionality
of the mixed success of arms control initiatives and perceived renewed nuclear threats driven
by the eroding “liberal international order”.
As long as realist Cold War and alarmist narratives continue to define the discourse
on nuclear technology, leaders and academics, particularly in the west, will continue to look
in the wrong direction by focusing on weapons when they should also be paying attention to
Russia and China’s gains in nuclear energy. This has profound implications for foreign policy
and the shaping of the emerging world order.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The over-arching phenomenon to be studied is the nuclear dimension of energy
geopolitics. The hegemonic nature of nuclear power has changed over time with the
simultaneous diminishing of Western dominance and the growing influence of the Global
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South. Therefore, Grounded Theory, which, according to Merriam & Tisdell (2015),
addresses “questions about process; that is, how something changes over time”, is the
appropriate analytical framework for the study.
As Russia and China exercise hegemony through cooperation within the BRICS
organization and in greater South-South relations, Cox’s Political-Economic Hegemony
Theory is the most appropriate theoretical foundation upon which to base research for this
paper. Since Russia and China’s emergence as nuclear energy hegemons within a governance
context are relatively unstudied and overlooked, Critical Theory, which Bronner (2011)
argues, “must respond to the new problems and the new possibilities for liberation that arise
from changing historical circumstance”, is the appropriate framework under which to conduct
research. At the same time, Grounded Theory, which Saldaña (2011) describes as “an
analytic process of constantly comparing small data units” (in this case, case studies of
Russian, Chinese, and American nuclear energy strategies), is the logical foundation for
comparative analysis and is a practical approach to employ in building a definition of Nuclear
Hegemony.
The primary methodology employed in this study consists of collecting and analyzing
case studies under the Canonical Genre of qualitative research. (Marshall et al., 2021) Most
contemporary literature about the philosophical and theoretical concepts of hegemony is
oriented around Gramsci’s writings on power dynamics characterized by the transactions of
socio-political groups as models to counter fascism, which modern scholars such as Hayes
and Cox adapted and framed within geopolitical discourse. Considering that Gramsci was
interested in alternate systems of governance (which is particularly relevant with the
emergence of BRICS and other “counter-hegemonic” actors), his work and those of his
modern counterparts are a logical foundation upon which to develop an appropriate concept
of hegemony for the first phase of research for this paper.

9

The second phase consisted of case studies of Russian, Chinese, and American
foreign policy and nuclear programs, encompassing analyses of government publications
(where available) from all three states, as well as research and commentaries by western,
Asian, and Eurasian academic institutions, think tanks, and media, who identified both the
mechanisms by which these actors penetrated foreign nuclear markets, how their presence
and capacity can and do affect how their client states behave, and to project how they may
exercise their political, economic, and scientific advantages on the geopolitical stage.
During the third and final phase, the definition of Nuclear Hegemony is developed
using Critical Genre approaches (Marshall et al.,) such as Critical Ethnography and Critical
Discourse, based on Hayes’ Political-Economic Hegemony Theory. The hegemonic tools
identified in the case studies were incorporated into traditional perceptions of hegemony and
framed within international relations theories of Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism.

DISCUSSION
Hegemony Conceived
We will proceed with a working conceptual idea of hegemony based on Hegemonic
Stability Theory (Gilpin, Keohane), which attempts to explain how more endowed states
leverage their political and economic advantage to influence the behavior of less endowed
states. In simple terms, according to Joseph (2003), hegemony concerns the relationship
between a dominant group’s leadership and a subordinate group’s consent.
Cox’s analysis of hegemony traces its modern origins to the work of Antonino
Gramsci, former leader of the Italian Communist Party. While imprisoned in Italy, Gramsci
wrote a series of papers that focused on defeating fascism and envisioned alternative models
of the social fiber of the state based on Marxist concepts of an emergent working class that
could exercise power in the state.
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Contemporary scholars have struggled to define hegemony concretely. Ougaard
(1988), for example, attempts to define hegemony first within the context of resource
distribution in which hegemony represents “a preponderance of material power resources”,
and second within the context of a state pursuing its own interests within an environment of
conflict. Clingan (2013) attempts to define hegemony through economic indicators,
suggesting, for example, that a state has achieved hegemony when its economy is larger than
the next three combined. However, he notes that a definitive determination is a challenge
because conventional measures such as GDP, GDP per capita, and output per worked hour, to
name a few, yield different results. He also cites geography and distance as a limit on
hegemony, noting that the ability to exert power diminishes proportionately with distance
from power centers and resources.
Other scholars, such as Cox, focus on conditions conducive to achieving hegemonic
capacity. He suggests that a prerequisite feature of a hegemon is the foundation and
protection of a world order that originated with a social or economic revolution in the
hegemonic state that then spilled over to other states. Consistent with Wallerstein’s Worldsystems theory, in which socially, politically, and economically advanced “core” states exert
influence on less developed “semi-peripheral” and “peripheral” states, (Agnew, 2020) we can
witness this phenomenon during the mid-nineteenth century British hegemonic expansion,
the United States’ global position post World War II, and more recently during we are seeing
the economic and political influence of the BRICS organization spreading to other states in
the Global South. (Teslova, 2022)
Beyond these sources, there are few identifiable definitive factors that can be used to
evaluate a state’s hegemonic status. Scholars of nuclear governance should not be
discouraged by this but should instead see this as an opportunity to break new ground in this
re-emerging field of study. Central to defining Nuclear Hegemony is the acknowledgment of
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the hegemon’s capacity to make the rules by which other players abide through “the
elaboration of political projects, the articulation of interests, the construction of social
alliances, the development of historical blocs, the deployment of state strategies and the
initiating of passive revolutions.” (Joseph)

International Relations Theory: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism
The three key international relations theories of Realism, Liberalism, and
Constructivism seek to explain why and how sovereign states, who control all social,
economic, and political activity within their borders, pursue their own interests and selfpreservation absent accountability to a prevailing institution (Mearsheimer, 1994) in a
“competitive, often ruthless, Hobbesian domain” known as anarchy. (Gilpin, 2012; Glaser,
2019) Thomson (1995) defines sovereignty as the” recognition by internal and external actors
that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its
territory”.
Norwich University (n.d.) characterizes Realism as an environment in which a state
acts to maximize its social, economic, and political power and influence in the interest of
self-preservation. According to Donnelly (2014), “Realism emphasizes the constraints on
politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together,
they make international relations largely a realm of power and interests.”
Because states will almost always act in their own self-interest, (Gilpin, 2007) the
state’s behavior is manifest through power. (Morgenthau & Thompson, 2018) Any action,
including military action, is therefore justified in the interest of selfpreservation(Schwarzenberger, 1964) as articulated by Schurmann’s Political-Military
Hegemony theory, which is based on “direct political and military rule by one state over
many aspects of the internal and important aspects of the external policies of other states” and
is inherently coercive.
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As one state acquires power, it diminishes other states’ relative power and influence.
From a realist geopolitical perspective, hegemony can therefore be conceived as a global
power system in which a state can exercise its economic and military dominance to “regularly
get its way.” (Clingan) The subsequent system of winners and losers creates a perpetual state
of competition for power and influence (Waltz, 2010), which inevitably leads to conflict.
Liberalism is defined by “an emphasis on international cooperation as a means of
furthering each nation’s respective interests.” (Norwich University) The common market
function of the European Union is an excellent articulation of liberal thought in which a
capitalist, liberalized, integrated open market functions as the optimal mechanism to produce
goods and services and ensure happiness and prosperity (Fukuyama, 1989) for its member
states. It also creates a system of interdependence, in which states’ collective wellbeing
depends on their ability to cooperate. (Paul, 2012) Interdependency, in theory, minimizes the
likelihood of armed conflict, but it also requires states to relinquish their sovereignty, in
certain policy areas, to a supranational authority. Liberal theory, therefore, aligns with Cox,
Fenton’s (2018), and Mollakkattu’s (2009) concept of hegemonic power as based on the
compatibility of interests between the hegemon and consenting states who willingly accept
and (sometimes) actively participate in the supranational authority of the hegemon.
Constructivism “rests on the notion that rather than the outright pursuit of material
interests, it is a nation’s belief systems—historical, cultural and social —that explain its
foreign policy efforts and behavior”. (Norwich University) States are not the most important
actors in international relations because international institutions and other non-state actors
are valuable in influencing behavior through lobbying and acts of persuasion. (Norwich
University) It could be argued that the emergence of the BRICS organization to challenge
western hegemony and reshape western-dominated global institutions represents a nascent
constructivist hegemonic order.

13

While a firm understanding of these IR theories is crucial to building a definition of
Nuclear Hegemony, it is critically important to recognize that hegemony within a nuclear
context is evolving and therefore contains elements of some or all three theories, which are
often contradictory. Saull (2017), for example, balances liberal and realist approaches,
describing hegemony as “international leadership by one political subject, be it the state or a
“historical bloc” of particular social groupings(…)of other, weaker, less powerful parties.”
Alternately, while Hayes notes that nuclear geopolitics are “nuclear bloc” politics
versus “balance-of-power” politics, suggesting that he views nuclear politics through a liberal
lens versus a strict realist approach, Cox notes the applicability of Gramsci’s concept of
hegemony to global governance because of the interplay of power groups and “alternate
states” which is particularly relevant with the emergence of BRICS and other constructivist
organizations.
Before we add the layer of nuclear technology to our analysis, two final points
need to be made about hegemony and international relations: 1. While Realism and liberalism
appear to be the dominant IR theories that arise when analyzing hegemony, it is important to
remember that while these conventional concepts have shaped academic thought on the
subject, we are venturing into a new political arena with newly emergent players and new
concepts of world orders that are challenging these concepts. Therefore, we must be
vigilantly mindful of the role that Constructivism and constructivist institutions can play in
shaping contemporary concepts of hegemony; 2. That notwithstanding, it is equally important
to be mindful that despite the cooperative and consensual verbiage of nuclear agreements,
Cox warns us that when analyzing hegemony, coercion is always implied.

Perspectives on Nuclear Energy
Nuclear technology remains controversial in many parts of the world, particularly in
the west. Many western countries have voiced strong opposition to nuclear energy, ranging
from safety and security concerns to costs. Critics of nuclear energy, for example, warn of the
14

potentially disastrous effects of reactor failure. The Union of Concerned Scientists (2013) list
seven accidents associated with nuclear energy, including the melting of the Windscale 1 core
in Cumbria, UK, in 1957 and the accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States,
Chornobyl, Ukraine (former Soviet Union) in 1986, and most recently the Fukushima Daiichi
reactor in Japan in 2011. The human casualties and environmental, structural, and capital
damage that render affected areas indefinitely uninhabitable are sufficient reasons for many
to oppose nuclear energy. Some critics, such as Muellner et al., (2021) also argue that nuclear
power’s contribution to mitigating climate change will be minimal (although their argument
comes from a “main source of future electricity generation” rather than its efficacy as part of
a greater diversified production strategy).
In addition to the environmental, structural, and capital damage caused by reactor
failures, the safe transportation and storage of radioactive nuclear waste, (Gardoni & Murphy,
2015; Jacoby, 2020; Saraç-Lesavre et al., 2021; Siegel, 2020) the weaponization of uranium,
which is the main fuel that is enriched and used to power nuclear reactors, (World Nuclear
Association, n. d.) and concerns of nuclear war between both major nuclear states and actors
outside the nuclear regime such as North Korea, (Grove, 2022; Pazzanese, 2022) make
nuclear technology unacceptable for many.
Finally, opponents argue that the upfront capital cost and build time of nuclear
reactors make them economically unsound, particularly as the cost of renewable production
continues to fall and with the (until recently) relatively low cost of natural gas. (Dunai &
Clercq, 2019; Ferguson, 2011; Lovins, 2021)
Proponents of nuclear energy argue that it plays a unique role in energy security by
providing carbon-free, reliable, cost-effective energy. Meserve (2009) argues that nuclear
power is an attractive energy source, not only in combatting climate change but in providing
energy reliably and relatively cheap. Hassan et al. (2020) point out that nuclear energy can
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contribute significantly to “ensuring energy security” while also reducing carbon pollution in
developing nations and economies, such as the BRICS countries, where reliable, carbon-free
energy is crucial.
In terms of safety, proponents argue that enhanced safety standards implemented
since the Fukushima accident will ensure the continued safe operations of nuclear reactors.
According to the World Nuclear Association (2022b), these standards have been effective
since there have been no further accidents since their implementation. They also argue that
current facilities for the transportation and storage of nuclear waste are sufficient. (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 2021) Finally, proponents argue that the weaponization of uranium
is unlikely because few non-nuclear states or non-state actors have the facilities to enrich
uranium, which is usually enriched to between 3 and 5% for power production, (Center for
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, n.d.) to weapons-grade at 90%. (World Nuclear
Association, 2017)
Despite the substantial capital costs of conventional Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs),
which critics argue are unwarranted compared to the lower costs of renewable energy and
natural gas, institutions such as the World Nuclear Association (2021b), the Nuclear Energy
Association (2021), and scholars such as Rhodes (2018), Swanek (2018), and Ulmer-Scholle
(2022) argue that nuclear energy has an overall lower cost long-term.
With new technology on the horizon in the form of, among other promising
technological developments, Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), nuclear energy has the
potential flexibility and adaptability to be a significant “resource in humanity’s arsenal in the
fight against climate change” (Siegel) reliably and more cost-effectively. SMRs, according to
Budinger & Bauman, will mitigate many safety concerns raised by nuclear opponents
because they do not need water or giant cooling towers. They can operate with minimal
manpower, thus mitigating the lack of technical capacity in many developing countries. The
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design is inherently safe and includes automatic shutdown mechanisms in the event of an
overheat (Cho, 2019; Parshley, 2021). Because of their small design, SMRs can also be
constructed onsite, reproduced, transported, and deployed more quickly, efficiently, and at a
lower cost than conventional large-scale reactors. (Fitzpatrick, 2017; Iurshina et al., 2019)

The International Atomic Energy Agency: A Nuclear Hegemon?
As Cox notes, international organizations, such as the United Nations, and the Bretton
Woods institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), are
mechanisms “through which the universal norms of a world hegemony are expressed.” He
notes five attributes of international organizations that “express their hegemonic role:
(1) They embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world order;
(2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order; (3) they
ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from
peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas.”
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous international
organization within the United Nations (IAEA, 2016). Within the U.N. system, it works with
over 12 U.N. agencies, including close coordination with the U.N. Security Council and the
European Commission within the European Union. It officially came into being on 29 July,
1957 with President Dwight Eisenhower’s ratification of the U.S. Statute. (IAEA). According
to the Statute (2014), its objectives are to “accelerate and enlarge” the capacity of nuclear
energy to promote peace and prosperity worldwide, contribute to improvements in health and
medicine, and ensure that it is not used for military purposes. It also aims to enable “countries
that were not among the advanced nuclear powers to take advantage of the nuclear age for a
variety of uses and ensuring that nuclear facilities were not diverted from civil to military
uses.” (de Blasio & Nephew)
As an actor, The IAEA procures over one hundred million dollars annually in goods
and services, most of which are delivered to member states worldwide. The list of services
17

includes construction services and upgrades for nuclear facilities, disposal of nuclear waste,
supplies, and equipment related to nuclear technology, raw materials for production, and
goods and services related to safety and security. It serves a crucial role as the international
safeguards inspectorate, which verifies compliance by non-nuclear weapon states with
international rules under the NPT. As a resource, the IAEA’s initiatives and programs, as
well as research and publications, are utilized by member states to pursue their interests,
which range from energy production to medicine, health and food production, and ultimately
to weapons policy.
Brown (2015) argues that the IAEA has established itself as an international nuclear
authority and is “an autonomous agent of global governance”, having managed to gain
considerable compliance and cooperation from the international community on its rules and
services implemented. It has also established legitimacy by utilizing a strong policy bias
relative to other international organizations.
The IAEA wields authority through two sources of independent power in international
governance which Barkin (2013) identifies as moral authority and political entrepreneurship.
Moral authority, he maintains, can be manifest in two areas. The first area is the legitimacy of
the IAEA to act as an “official voice” and to command the global community’s attention on
nuclear technology issues. Secondly, as Brown notes, favorable assets such as the ability to
leverage economies of scale in its projects and its perceived apolitical nature both also give
weight to its moral authority, which can compel states to comply or consent in certain policy
areas.
Political entrepreneurship, according to Barkin, is a process by which specific
political positions are advanced through governance mechanisms. Thus, the IAEA is able to
wield power by focusing international attention on issues that they deem important, as
Secretary-General Mohamed El Baradei did through his initiative to prevent the militarization
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of nuclear energy and ensure safety in peaceful applications (United Nations, 2005) for which
he and the IAEA were awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.
Considering that the IAEA is funded mainly by Member State contributions as well as
some voluntary contributions, its activities logically reflect the interests of its biggest
contributors. Findlay (2012) maintains that international organizations’ budgets are
“determined by a combination of politics, history, organizational inertia, competing priorities,
and the health of member states’ finances.” Therefore, despite its moral authority, legitimized
by its role in the NPT and Nobel prize, the IAEA is nonetheless asymmetrically dependent on
funding from member states and represents the western global order that many non-aligned
nations are now challenging.
Recalling Cox’s five hegemonic attributes of international organizations, it can be
argued that the IAEA does embody rules that facilitate the expansion of the hegemonic world
order. However, its activities are limited mainly to safety and security and therefore do not
play a significant role in influencing states’ behavior in geopolitics. While it is a product of
the hegemonic world order and legitimates its norms, those norms are still defined by western
values that are informed in a decidedly unidirectional manner. By perpetuating what can be
perceived as western values, it could be argued that the IAEA continues to promote western
hegemonic ideas versus absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas. Based on Cox’s criteria and the
IAEA’s limited capacity to influence and inform the geopolitical behavior of states beyond
areas of nuclear safety and security, not to mention the internal challenges it faces to function
properly in even this capacity, this work concludes that it is not a hegemon.

Russia: The World's One-stop Nuclear Shop
Over the last two decades, Russia has become the world's go-to supplier of nuclear
technology, especially for countries new to the civilian nuclear market. She is deeply
experienced in constructing and maintaining nuclear plants, has considerable industrial and
scientific capacity, as well as market share of the global uranium supply, and has the capacity
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to reclaim spent nuclear fuel from client states. By positioning itself as a one-stop-shop for
reactors, fuel supply and reclamation, financing, and worker training, (Lovering & Halland,
2022) Russia embodies the Dependency dimension of Nuclear Hegemony.
Russia's rise as a nuclear energy player started in 2006 with the Kremlin's $55-billion
plan to become a "leading global supplier of nuclear power". (Conant, 2013) By 2014 Russia
had built 37 percent of all new nuclear reactors, compared to the US's 7 percent. (Lecavalier,
2015) Of the 439 nuclear reactors currently operating globally, 38 generate electricity in
Russia. Additionally, 42 Russian-designed VVER reactors operate in Armenia, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, India, Slovakia, and Ukraine, and an additional fifteen
were under construction in Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Finland, Hungary, India, Iran,
Slovakia, and Turkey as of 2021. (Bowen & Dabbar, 2022a) She has signed bilateral nuclear
cooperation agreements with a total of 47 countries and has nuclear energy footprints in
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and South America. (Lovering & Halland, 2022)
According to the IAEA, (2021) Russia enjoys competitive strength in nuclear energy
through its technological capacity, which includes intellectual property, manufacturing
infrastructure, and workforce. Through its state-owned atomic energy corporation, Rosatom,
Russia is able to "oversee and work at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and production
chain, from uranium mining to decommissioning of nuclear facilities or management of spent
nuclear fuel", which enables it to construct and operate nuclear reactors safely and
economically. This makes it an attractive partner for energy-hungry states, especially
developing states with limited capacity and financial resources.
She is also able to exercise considerable power in the nuclear Supply Chain through
the considerable market share capture (Sallee, 2021) of many of the components of energy
production. Through Rosatom, Russia controls key facilities in the mining, milling,
conversion, and enrichment of uranium, as well as fuel fabrication and the manufacture and
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distribution of "equipment, parts, and services for nuclear reactors." (Bowen & Dabbar,
2022b) According to Lovering & Halland, (2022) Russia controls nearly half of the global
uranium enrichment capacity. Together with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, they supply half of
the U.S.'s nuclear power imports and nearly 40 percent of Europe's.
Currently, Rosatom is the only nuclear supplier that can reclaim spent nuclear fuel
from foreign clients to temporarily store and reprocess. (Kim, 2021; Schepers, 2019)
Considering that most developing states and emerging economies lack the capacity to safely
manage nuclear waste (which can potentially be weaponized) and considering that proper
storage and management continue to challenge even developed states, the reclamation of
spent fuel makes Russia not only an attractive supplier for "nuclear newcomer states", (Kerr,
n.d.) but also offers a strong counter-narrative against criticism of her lax safety standards
(Stulberg et al., 2021) and provides safeguard mechanism nuclear waste.
Since Rosatom is a state-owned enterprise (SOE), Russia can easily penetrate the
nuclear export market by offering client states government subsidized loans with favorable
terms that the U.S. cannot match. (Hayunga, 2020) Like China, this gives the Russian
government direct and complete control over not only the construction of nuclear equipment
and supply chains but also financing. This gives both countries a competitive advantage over
the U.S., whose Export-Import Bank (EXIM) lending schemes are regulated by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Arrangement on
Officially Supported Export Credits which severely limited the financing of its nuclear
exports until recently. (Nakano)
Ultimately, this means that Russia can establish a nuclear foothold in many client
states efficiently and cheaply. In addition to financing 90% of the Rooppur Nuclear Power
Plant in Bangladesh, and nearly 50% of the El Daaba reactor in Egypt (Schneider et al.,
2018), Rosatom also offered to fund 100% of a nuclear project in Hungary, though Hungary
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ultimately accepted a lesser amount. (Saha, 2017). Most Russian NPPs are built under EPC
(Engineering, Procurement, and Construction) or "turnkey" contracts, (Lieu, 2020) where
Rosatom designs and builds the reactors and then hands them over to the client state's utility
company. (Schepers, 2019) However, the Akkuyu reactor in Turkey, which is currently under
construction, was contracted under a "Build-Own-Operate" (BOO) agreement, where
Rosatom will finance and retain ownership of the estimated $22 billion project (Schneider et
al.) and sell electricity back to Turkey (Sallee, 2021) While the financial efficacy of the BOO
remains to be seen, Russia's energy strategy is proving to be a reliable source of income. As
Schepers notes, from Rosatom's 2017 "Performance of State Atomic Energy Corporation"
report, more than one-third of Rosatom's international revenue came from NPP constriction.
By establishing itself as a one-stop shop for nuclear energy production that includes
"flexible financing options, training opportunities, and support with developing nuclear
infrastructures related to safety, security, non-proliferation and export control requirements",
(Schepers, 2019) Russia has ensured that its clients will remain dependent for all aspects of
production and for a long time, considering the length of nuclear projects. It also ensures a
steady income stream with the potential for parallel long-term partnerships in other areas of
cooperation with its client states. It is, therefore, positioned to leverage its control of the
supply chain to exert influence over its clients in the greater geopolitical environment over a
long period of time. Given current events, this is concerning. As Russia controls a substantial
supply of the world's natural gas, which it has been accused of politicizing and weaponizing.
(Eddy & Stevis-Gridneff, 2022; Sabadus, 2022) the implication that it could employ a similar
strategy with nuclear power is obvious. By controlling 40% of the global uranium conversion
market and 46% of global uranium enrichment capacity, (Bowen & Dabbar; 2022b) Russia
could easily disrupt the energy supply of any country dependent on it. This potential threat is
not limited to prospective client states, as evident by the fact that despite its activities in
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Ukraine, Russia's uranium exports have yet to be sanctioned. (Arai & Hanawa, 2022;
Freebairn, 2022; Hunnicutt & Scheyder, 2022; Wesolowsky, 2022)
Consequently, it can be concluded that Russia is exercising its Nuclear Hegemony by
virtue of establishing a firm system of dependency through which it can exercise power over
other states. While the cooperative nature of its bilateral agreements implies power by
consent, the coercive, realist potential is nonetheless apparent.

China: Financing the Global Nuclear Belt
China's geopolitical nuclear power strategy is best conceived as a component of her
Belt and Road Initiative (Ramana, 2022; Yi, 2018), which is branded as "a transcontinental
long-term policy and investment program which aims at infrastructure development and
acceleration of the economic integration of countries along the route of the historic Silk
Road" (BRI, n.d.) that is intended to connect Asia, Europe, and Africa (Chatzky & McBride,
2020)
The BRI is a two-pronged initiative consisting of a land corridor, known as the Silk
Road Economic Belt (SREB), and a sea corridor, known as the Maritime Silk Road (MRS),
that will connect China with Europe and strategic sites in Africa through infrastructure
projects related to energy, commerce, and transportation. (Kim, 2021) So far, 143 countries
have agreed to participate in the BRI with about $8 trillion of announced investments.
(Sandalow, 2019) When completed, the BRI will span over 70 countries, representing 60% of
the global population and nearly 30% of the global GDP. (Sarwar, 2018)
The SREB has three main routes through Eurasia: the northern route from China to
Northern Europe via the Eurasia land bridge through Russia to Germany; the middle route
consisting of oil and gas pipelines running from Beijing to Paris via Afghanistan and
Kazakhstan; and the southern route consisting of transnational highways running from
Beijing through Southern Xinjiang, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Italy, through to Spain.
(Sarwar) The MRS meanwhile aims to establish a seabound network by developing,
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constructing, expanding, and operating ports, industrial parks, and special economic zones
(SEZs) throughout the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. (Ghiasy et al.,2018)
Sarwar argues that, unlike the original Silk Road, which facilitated trade and cultural
exchanges between the east and west, the BRI is not only "an overt expression of China's
power ambitions in the 21st century” but is also a geopolitical tool for China to counter the
U.S.'s geopolitical pivot to Asia, and function as a foundation of a new global economy
centered around China. Ayres, (2017) and Hillman & Sacks, (2021) and Zhang (2018)
likewise caution about the political and economic threats that the BRI represents, not only to
the west but also to BRI host countries.
Other scholars, such as Jin, (2017) suggest that China, BRI host countries, and even
peripheral countries will benefit from the improved political and diplomatic relations that will
be facilitated by the enhanced infrastructure connectivity, deepening economic cooperation,
and person-to-person interactions facilitated by the BRI.
Kim (2021) conducted extensive research for the Wilson Center on the nuclear energy
aspect of the BRI, which she notes is "important and understudied." China's global nuclear
strategy, which aims at global dominance in high-tech sectors, was articulated in its 10-year
"Made in China 2025" industrial policy in 2015. Through the BRI, she aims to build up to 30
overseas nuclear reactors by 2030, having (Reuters, 2019b) already built four nuclear reactors
in Pakistan, with the goal to build 2 more. (Parameswaran, 2015; Tabeta, 2020) She is also in
various stages of development of nuclear energy programs in Romania, Argentina, Brazil, the
UK, Iran, Turkey, South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Armenia, The Philippines,
Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia. (Rogers & Crow‐Miller, 2017; WNA, 2022b)
China's domestic nuclear market has grown substantially over the last three decades.
Driven by increasingly poor air quality from coal-fired power plants in the 1970s, Beijing
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began to develop alternative energy sources. (Fairley, 2018; WNA) Therefore, Beijing began
to invest heavily in domestic nuclear energy production.
Currently, China develops, constructs, and operates nuclear reactors through its three
state-owned nuclear agencies: the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), the China
General Nuclear Power Group (CGN), and the State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC)
(WNA).
China's substantial investment in its nuclear industry (Baker et al., 2017) has enabled
it to develop an array of domestically produced reactor models, such as the Hualong One
(whose design is based on western technology) and is protected by intellectual property
rights. (Reuters, 2019a) The first exported Hualong One reactor began construction in
Pakistan in 2015 and commenced operation in May 2021. It is expected that China will
ultimately construct a total of six nuclear reactors in that country. (ANS, 2021) According to
Sallee, this homegrown reactor will give China access to new revenue streams and facilitate
the building of stronger partnerships abroad. It is also representative of "China breaking the
monopoly of foreign nuclear power technology and officially entering the technology's first
batch of advanced countries."
Like Russia, China is able to penetrate the foreign nuclear market by offering
generous and flexible financial terms, such as low-interest and concessionary loans with long
grace periods (Chatzky & McBride; Mehta, 2020) to client states for whom nuclear reactors
would otherwise be unaffordable. (American Security Project, 2019; Bastian, J.; 2021;
Chatzky & McBride; Kim) Since these contracts often lack transparency, (Bastian, Gupta,
and Hurley et al.) client states are likely not fully aware of what they are committing to.
According to Bing-Ming (2021), these financial arrangements, and the length of time
of nuclear projects equate to a "marriage [that] is not easily dissolved." He goes on to explain
that if a client state enters into a nuclear agreement with China and then decides to suspend
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the project in the pre-construction phase, it is liable for sizeable damages to China for breach
of contract. Once reactor construction has begun, Bing-Ming continues, "the marriage is truly
ironclad." This is because China, like Russia, has developed a supply chain that includes
partnerships for uranium imports with BRI partners Namibia and Kazakhstan (WNA, 2021a),
as well as control of equipment, technology, workforce, and waste disposal supplies and
facilities by her state-owned nuclear utilities, rendering the client state dependent over a long
time.
Some critics claim that China's financial strategies harm client states, leaving them
vulnerable and dependent on China. (Ayres, 2017; Brattberg & Soula, 2018; Chatzky &
McBride, 2020; Hurley et al., 2021) Others, such as Gupta (2020) and Mehta, suggest that
they are a deliberate tactic to lure states into "debt traps" through which China can secure a
long-term foothold in other countries and acquire control of their resources and strategic
locations.
In any case, the debt crises in many of China's client states are causing concern. The
situation is particularly dire in Africa, where China is the top lender. (Chaudhury, 2021)
Despite denial by the Kenyan government, concern remains that Kenya could lose its port in
Mombasa to China over its struggles to repay its $50 billion debt. (Chaudhury, 2019) Angola
is likewise having to repay its debt in crude oil, (Pandey, 2018) leaving little for the country.
Elsewhere, Tajikstan reportedly ceded 1,100 kilometers of disputed territory to China in
exchange for debt forgiveness for an unspecified amount. (Gupta, 2020) China also assumed
an 85% stake in the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka under a 99-year concession for the $1.1
billion package for the construction of the port.
From a hegemonic standpoint, we could consider China's nuclear strategy as a
synthesis of the liberal and constructivist approaches. Its nuclear programs consist of bilateral
agreements based on consent that have the dual potential to fulfill client states' energy needs
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while affording China access to resources it needs to manage its domestic challenges. China
is also incorporating new ideas and approaches by partnering with client states outside the
traditional nuclear regime while embarking on one of the most ambitious infrastructure
programs in history.
Throughout this analysis, we must heed our contemporaries' warning that in any
hegemonic relationship, coercion is always implied. China is in various stages of nuclear
cooperation with the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Kenya,
and Namibia, (WNA, 2022f) who are all participating in the BRI. (FSIF, 2021) Suppose we
frame China's nuclear export strategy within the context of the BRI. In that case, it is easy to
envision a coastal nuclear maritime route from China through the highly contested Malacca
Strait (Greco, 2022) around the Indian Ocean and back.
Therefore, it could be argued that China is building hegemony in nuclear energy by
establishing a supply chain that includes fuel, technological know-how, hardware, manpower,
and disposal, similar to Russia. Driven by the aspirations of the BRI, it has been able to
expand its hegemonic footprint by offering innovative and relatively affordable reactors with
appealing financing terms that, while offering its client states cheap, reliable, and low-carbon
energy could also render them not only dependent but also obligated for nearly a century if
they default. Therefore, the latent coercive implications of hegemony are always there.

The United States: The Original Nuclear Hegemon
For decades, according to Poneman et al., (2017) the United States was the alpha and
the omega of nuclear technologies. It established a new hegemonic world order post World
War II, (Cox) leveraging its dominance of the global nuclear exports market to shape
international nuclear governance through the Cold War. (Sallee) It could be argued that the
U.S.'s entry into contemporary nuclear geopolitics was one of experimentation. Jurewitz
(2002) notes that the first phase of nuclear development, which took place between 1955 and
1974, consisted of a series of "commitments to commercial development [that] were made
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amidst massive technical uncertainties." Drogan, likewise, characterizes American nuclear
exports as financial commitments to "learning by doing". This stands to reason because the
post-World War II world order was still taking shape, and nuclear technology capabilities and
utilization were still unclear. This analysis frames the American civilian nuclear program and
its utilization as a foreign policy tool within a context of experimentation that we can
consider a blueprint upon which other prospective nuclear hegemons built their programs.
The United States' nuclear foreign policy was initially marked by both a "legacy of
assumptions, options, and fears" inherited post-World War II from the Roosevelt
administration (Bernstein, 1975) and a policy approach based on "technology denial and
secrecy". (Lavoy, 2003) The latter point is evident with the implementation of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 during the Truman administration, which aimed to restrict access to
nuclear technology and equipment and prevent the dissemination of scientific data. (de Blasio
& Nephew, 2017; Hicks, 2014). The Soviet Union's first detonation of a thermonuclear
device in 1953, (Medhurst) however, made it clear that nuclear technology could not be
contained and thus began "the great contest between Western freedom and Soviet
totalitarianism". (Gattie & Massey, 2020)
In the context of this great contest, the Eisenhower administration adopted a new
approach to nuclear technology, which became known as the "Atoms for Peace" program,
(Lavoy) which Rowberry (2013) describes as an exchange of American research reactors,
fuel and scientific training for developing countries' commitment to use the technology only
for "peaceful, civilian purposes." This approach, which Mateos & Suárez-Díaz (2016) argue
was "an essential piece in the U.S. defense strategy and foreign policy at the beginning of the
Cold War", led to the creation of the IAEA and included the 1954 amendment to the Atomic
Energy Act. The amendment "liberalized the US nuclear enterprise by allowing private
companies to develop and construct nuclear reactors domestically" (Gattie & Massey) and
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allowed industry to engage with foreign partners in the sharing of scientific and technological
knowledge for peaceful use (Lavoy) under federal government regulation.
Medhurst identifies four dimensions of the Atoms for Peace Program: 1. The Military
and Security dimension, in which nuclear technology was reframed to focus public attention
on its societal benefits and divert attention away from its destructive capabilities while the
U.S. concurrently built up its nuclear arsenal to counter the Soviet Union; 2. The Economic
dimension, which would create a domestic power industry and afford access to foreign
markets by constructing NPPs; 3. The Diplomatic dimension, through which the U.S. would
build trust with the Soviets through the IAEA and lead to eventual disarmament; 4. The
Psychological dimension, which would build the U.S. brand as a benevolent and peace-loving
nation that would help the world's impoverished nations develop (and simultaneously contain
frame the USSR and Communist ideology as obstacles to peace and prosperity).
While he acknowledges the Economic, Diplomatic, and Psychological dimensions,
Medhurst emphasizes the impact of the Military and Security dimension, the ultimate aim of
which, he argues, was the "nuclearization" of the U.S.'s NATO allies to rebuff the Soviet
Union. Several factors support this argument: 1. The U.S.'s first three nuclear cooperation
agreements were with Belgium, Canada, and Great Britain (Colgan & Miller, 2019); 2. U.S.
nuclear exports have not enjoyed much success in regions such as Latin America (Drogan,
2019) and other countries less connected to the Cold War; 3. As Gonzalez noted, while other
countries began to consider alternative energy sources, including nuclear energy, during the
1970s oil crisis, the U.S., whose civilian nuclear efforts were already on the decline (Joskow
& Parsons, 2009), chose not to reconsider nuclear power. If energy security was a vital
element of the U.S. nuclear strategy, why was it not more rigorously pursued during the
crisis? This paper, therefore, accepts NATO nuclearization, or more broadly, a classic realist,
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coercive strategy as the driving force behind Atoms for Peace and the underlying goal of the
U.S.'s nuclear foreign policy.
According to the 1954 National Security Council Report by the State Department,
initial nuclear exports were transacted through bilateral agreements where technology and
knowledge, including the building of reactors, were provided in exchange for "a steady flow
of radioactive ores" or other resources. In establishing these supply chains, Medhurst notes
that some of the U.S.'s relationships, such as those with Belgium, Australia, and South
Africa, were simple quid-pro-quo agreements that ensured a steady supply of uranium or
thorium in exchange for technology, hardware, human resources, and fissionable material. He
argues, however, that in less developed countries, the reactor programs "functioned as a form
of Industrial imperialism" where the U.S. could gain a technological and economic foothold
in countries that lacked nuclear capacity.
As with Russia and China's nuclear programs, these supply chains were crucial
mechanisms through which the US established dominance in nuclear energy production. The
architects of "Atoms for Peace" were aware that if the US industry could be the first to
establish a global nuclear presence in strategic countries, those countries would almost
inevitably be dependent for design, construction, initial operation, educational materials, and
every other aspect of the infant industry." (Medhurst)
Ultimately, according to Piercy, (2020) rising costs, the proliferation of renewable
energy and natural gas, not to mention the accident at Three Mile Island all contributed to the
decline of American leadership in nuclear energy.

Nuclear Hegemony Defined
We have established that current concepts of hegemony concern the capacity of a
dominant state to exercise influence and power over other, less powerful states. Analyses of
Russia, China, and U.S. civilian nuclear programs revealed that they have been able to
leverage their technological and financial capacities to penetrate foreign energy markets and
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exert power and influence over less developed countries by establishing Dependency over a
long period of time. Consequently, they have positioned themselves to assert influence in
global nuclear energy governance and the greater geopolitical landscape.
We have also established that there are differing scholarly concepts of the coercive
versus consensual exercise of the hegemonic relationship. One of the aims of this work is to
conceptualize a definition outside the coercive, realist narrative that frames much of the
discourse on nuclear technology. Russia and China have, at a superficial level at least,
adopted liberal or even constructivist characteristics in their nuclear exports as articulated by
cooperation and “win-win” scenarios where developing countries acquire low-carbon energy
production capacity while Russia and China gain access to foreign resources and access to
foreign markets for their surplus manufactured goods. They are also challenging current
nuclear governance by working with a variety of states outside the conventional western-lead
nuclear regime.
This paper, therefore, rejects the conventional terminology applied to states in
hegemonic relationships, such as dominance (Clingan, Gilpin, Joseph) or subordinate and
submissive (Cox, Fenton, Moolakkattu, 2009). This is because the traditional realist concept
of hegemony is neither suitable nor accurate when describing the power balance in nuclear
energy relationships, mainly because the fluctuating geopolitical landscape does not align
with conventional concepts of hegemony. As research suggests, these new relationships are,
at least on a surface level, displaying liberal and possibly constructivist features.
To more accurately articulate the role of actors in this new form of nuclear energy
governance, we conceive as “preponderant” the hegemon who controls a greater share of
resources and capacity (Ougaard) and leverages them to derive power from gaps (Craig,
2009) over the “acquiescent” client states who accept their expertise and leadership in their
nuclear programs. Incorporating the aforementioned terms, this work defines Nuclear
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Hegemony as “The leveraging of technological and financial nuclear capacities in energy
generation by preponderant states over acquiescent states by establishing a system of
dependency, encapsulating supply chain and financing mechanisms, over a multi-decadal
time frame to exercise geopolitical power and influence.”

Dimensions of Nuclear Hegemony
Analyses of Russia, China, and the U.S.’s nuclear energy programs have revealed two
dimensions of Nuclear Hegemony: Dependency and Time. Dependency refers to an
established relationship in which the hegemon controls all the physical elements and
materials of nuclear power generation to the extent that the client state cannot manage
production absent complete reliance on the hegemon’s preponderant capacities.
There are three Dependency mechanisms through which the hegemon exercises its
preponderance over an acquiescent state.
The first mechanism is technological capacity. The United States, Russia, and China
established dominance in nuclear power because their technological prowess faced little
competition. (Clifford, 2022; Graham Jr., 2022; Xie, 2022) The second mechanism is the
Supply Chain. By capturing a significant market share of uranium production and
commanding control of technology, intellectual property, hardware, workforce, and spent fuel
reclamation, the hegemon ensures that their clients can transact with only them for their
energy production. As a result, existing and future client states will continue to be Dependent
on them for the foreseeable future. Bing-Ming points out that the U.S., France, Russia, and
China all established robust supply chains for their nuclear industries. That these three
countries are still among the top 5 global nuclear energy producers (Kumar, 2021) is not a
coincidence.
The second Dependency mechanism is Financing. Both Russia and China offer
favorable financing terms to client statеs through bi-lateral nuclear agreements that often
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cover the majority of the costs of NPPs. Given the urgency of both energy demand and the
need for low-carbon production in developing states, such conditions are hard to refuse.
Therefore, Financing is a mechanism by which the hegemon can easily penetrate new
markets for their exports and assume control of assets in those markets in the event of a
default. However, as some case studies of Chinese agreements reveal, defaults, which are
likely outcomes in some developing countries, have sometimes resulted in those countries
having to repay their debts through concessionary means, such as forfeiture of some control
over their indigenous natural resources, or surrendering large stakes in commercial or
industrial ventures.
The Time dimension of Nuclear Hegemony concerns not only the expediency with
which NPPs can be built but also the lifespan of nuclear projects, which can last close to 100
years. Analyses of China and Russia’s foreign nuclear projects show that their autocratic
domestic political systems, government ownership of their nuclear industries, and financial
resources create a conducive environment for rapid design, construction, and implementation
of nuclear programs at home and for export. Consequently, they are in a better position to
deliver potential energy solutions to client states more quickly and affordably than western
states, which are impeded by democratic political systems, decentralized nuclear production,
and lack of access to capital to construct NPPs. In such environments, the resultant delays in
decision-making often cause nuclear projects to be delayed and go over budget, which
subsequently drives up costs.
As analysis has also revealed, the life span of nuclear projects, from design and
construction through to decommissioning, can last nearly 100 years. This ensures that client
states, who are already dependent on the hegemon for fuel, technology, hardware, and
manpower, will also be dependent and subject to its power and influence for nearly a century.
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LIMITATIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE AREAS FOR STUDY
Limitations
The aim of this paper is to interrogate the current usage of the term nuclear hegemony
and to create a foundation upon which further work on the hegemonic nature of nuclear
energy can be built. This work is a culmination of eleven months of diplomacy and
international relations studies. As previously noted, most literature and research on hegemony
is framed within a western perspective. Filtering the obvious biases against or favoring China
and her nuclear programs that informed much of the research was a profound challenge. I am
confident that my travels in Asia and China, my experience living in an Eastern European
country that is somewhat within Russia’s sphere of influence, and the insight and
perspectives I gained from studying in Switzerland have enriched my perspective sufficiently
to control for some of those biases.
Accessing some Russian government documents, presumably due to the current crisis
in Ukraine, and translating those that were available, were also considerable obstacles. I
substituted multiple alternate sources where appropriate to build a solid understanding of
Russia’s civilian nuclear strategies.
Finally, as I spent much of the last eleven months overseas, geographic distance, time
differences, and the lingering effects of the pandemic often prevented me from holding inperson consultations with advisors and colleagues, which would have augmented my work.
Fortunately, I was able to attend an in-person course in energy diplomacy in South Africa,
and those interactions have proven integral in properly framing my research.
Despite these mitigation strategies, it must be emphasized that we are in uncharted
waters and are barely getting our feet wet. With the limited time to conduct research and
analysis, coupled with the challenges noted above, the points raised in this work are merely
observational and far from conclusive. Much more research and analysis are required, and the
concepts discussed will require much refinement and revision. Nevertheless, I hope this very
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basic work will inspire others to wade deeper and chart a definitive course to understand
Nuclear Hegemony.

Applications
Under the current definition of Nuclear Hegemony, the hegemon can exercise power
in many ways. Through the Dependency dimension, a hegemon’s capture of the Supply
mechanism renders the client state dependent and vulnerable to hegemonic influence (Baker
et al.) to maintain energy supplies. As Kim points out, “nuclear vendors can threaten to
suspend fuel supplies”, as we can see with Russian supplies of natural gas to Europe.
Additionally, client states are dependent on the hegemon throughout the entire Supply Chain
for technology, hardware, workforce, and waste management.
Through the Finance mechanism, client states are dependent on the hegemon’s capital
to produce energy. As Mehta and Gupta have pointed out, default on loans can result in the
hegemon appropriating a client state’s resources or facilities. Using data from the World
Bank and IMF, Hurley et al. identified ten counties in Central, East, South, and Southeast
Asia, seven in the Middle East and Africa, and six in Europe and Eurasia that are suffering
high degrees of debt distress due to BRI-related financing. If previous examples inform
China’s behavior towards other indebted countries, we can see a potentially larger foothold
all around the BRI roadmap.
The Time dimension facilitates rapid penetration of the hegemon into the client state’s
markets and, due to the lifespan of nuclear reactors, ensures a relationship that can last up to a
century, during which the hegemon can grow its foothold in that state. (American Security
Project, Nakano,)
This intersectionality of Dependence and Time presents a profound paradigm. If we
accept British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s assertion that “a week is a long time in
politics”, (Stevenson, 2022) then a century in geopolitics might as well be a millennium. As
Russia, China, and other non-aligned countries continue to gain power and influence in the
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global system, 100 years is an enormous window for both countries to affect geopolitics as
Nuclear Hegemons. (Hayunga, Liu, Nakano, Schepers,)
We can use history to attempt a prediction of how these countries will assert their
hegemonic position. Geller characterizes Russia as “an aggressive, paranoid, power-seeking,
and autocratic state, no matter its leader.” Its foreign policy, he maintains, can be summarized
as a long history of aggression toward bordering countries, driven by an ongoing desire to
protect its borders but often marked by defeat and humiliation.
Regardless of Russia’s motivations, its primary foreign policy objective can be
conceived as an aim to secure its territorial and political sovereignty (Volker, 2022;
Palaccio,2022) and legitimize its status as a world leader. Its activities in Ukraine can be seen
as securing its territory in Europe and rebuffing further NATO expansion. On a global level,
its diplomatic activities in South and Central America can be seen as further efforts to contain
American spheres of influence. (Baker et al., Feldman & Lavi, 2022; Palaccio)
From a Nuclear Hegemonic perspective, it seeks to surpass the United States in
nuclear technology and “solidify its status as a top nuclear power.” (Geller) Its control of a
large share of uranium gives its nuclear supply chain leverage to which many countries,
including the U.S., are vulnerable. Its hegemonic power over many non-aligned countries,
defined by Dependency and Time, put it in a unique position to reshape global governance
within the nuclear realm and the greater sphere of geopolitics. It could, for example, compel
client states to support its measures and initiatives that increase its power in global
institutions such as the United Nations. (Baker et al.) That it enjoys significant revenues from
nuclear exports ensures that it has the financial means to further its activities in non-aligned
countries
While Shambaugh maintains that China “is a single-dimension power-economic”,
Bing-Ming argues that China’s economic ambitions as articulated through the BRI are
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“superseded by political considerations” characterized as a “pushback” against the U.S.’s
pivot to Asia. (Chatzky & McBride). China faces domestic challenges such as poverty,
income inequality, and energy insecurity. (Goodman, 2021; Ling & Wang, 2020) Therefore,
the BRI does serve an economic function by ensuring revenue and resource flows from its
overseas projects. Cavanna (2018) elaborates, characterizing the BRI as China’s effort to
stabilize “its western peripheries, rekindle its economy, propel non-Western international
economic institutions, gain influence in other countries, and diversify trade suppliers/routes
while circumventing the U.S. pivot to Asia.” Finally, according to Schuman (2021), China
seeks to reshape the world order in closer alignment with its own concepts of governance and
leadership, while Feldman & Lavi suggest that she is also eager to restore “the glory of its
past in the Imperial period.”
As a Nuclear Hegemon, China is in a position to secure its MRS goals by deploying
its nuclear exports in strategic coastal sites in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It
can gain acquiescence from client states in those sites by employing Finance mechanisms.
Should those client states default, it can appropriate resources or facilities over a long-term
period ensuring its power in those areas and securing its MRS foothold. As Kim points out,
China’s growing nuclear dominance, particularly in non-aligned states, puts it in a position to
leverage its power to not only ensure a steady supply of revenue and resource needs but also
reshape its position in nuclear and global governance by compelling client states to support
its positions in global institutions. (Brattberg & Soula, 2018; Chatzky & McBride)
With nuclear projects in various stages of development in Europe, including the
potential construction of a Hualong One reactor in the United Kingdom, which would be the
first Chinese-manufactured reactor to be constructed in Europe, (Baker et al., Hesketh et al.,
2022; Kim) China’s Nuclear BRI seems well poised to realize its goal of connecting Asia and
Europe and garner legitimacy for its nuclear prowess. Her nuclear overtures toward states in
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Central and South America, on the other hand, seem to indicate an attempt to contain the U.S.
(WNA, 2022f)
We can therefore view China exercising its Nuclear Hegemony to connect Asia to
Europe, secure its position in the South China Sea and Indian Oceans through the BRI, and
potentially leveraging it to change nuclear and global governance. Russia is utilizing Nuclear
Hegemony to secure its borders and regain former Soviet territory, with nuclear revenues
driving those efforts and potentially driving change in governance. Both are also attempting
to contain U.S. influence in Asia and Central and South America. Meanwhile, the U.S. and its
western allies are attempting to reestablish hegemony by reviving fuel supply chains,
financing nuclear exports, and accelerating new nuclear technology.
For the foreseeable future, it appears that Russia will continue to be the dominant
player (Kim), as it currently is the top nuclear exporter (Nakano), has considerable control
over the uranium market, offers favorable financial conditions, and can reclaim spent nuclear
fuel. (Bastian, Kim, Nakano) However, as Nakano argues, China has considerable capital that
could enable it to surpass Russia, especially if sanctions over Ukraine (Hayunga, Ramana)
impact its exports.
While Chatzky & McBride suggest that Russia and China could partner more closely
in nuclear projects, Yellen (2020) argues that this is not likely because they are competitors in
the market (something, he suggests, the U.S. should exploit). It is also worth noting that both
countries face obstacles to their hegemonic aspirations. Despite China’s nuclear ambitions, it
has suffered several delays in reactor construction. (Dangwal and Ramana) Meanwhile,
besides sanctions, Rosatom’s nuclear contract in Finland was recently canceled, (Liu, 2022)
and its contract with Hungary could see a similar fate. (Ramana) There has also been some
backlash from participating countries to the BRI (Chatzky & McBride) that could impede its
progress.
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At the same time, recent developments in the United States indicate more concrete
steps to reclaiming its Nuclear Hegemony. Earlier this year, the Biden administration
announced a $6 billion fund to keep some older domestic nuclear reactors operational and
more cost-effective. An additional $2.5 billion was invested in nuclear projects in
Washington State and Wyoming (Penn, 2022) Internationally,
In April 2022, the United States Senate introduced the International Nuclear Energy
Act, which aims to reestablish U.S. leadership in nuclear production by increasing
international nuclear energy cooperation by creating enhanced financing and security
mechanisms that facilitate civil nuclear exports. Additionally, Hayunga notes that EXIM can
finance large-scale projects again, and the ban on funding nuclear projects by International
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was lifted in 2020.
Ultimately, although Russia and China seem to be on a firm trajectory toward
achieving Nuclear Hegemony, the complex nature of nuclear energy, combined with the
geopolitical challenges they face, could severely impede their ability to realize their
aspirations’ full potential. By the same token, although the U.S. and the west face formidable
obstacles to reestablishing Nuclear Hegemony, recent promising developments could enable
them to reclaim their preponderance in global nuclear governance.

Areas for Future Study
An analysis of current geopolitical trends concerning nuclear governance has revealed
several areas where this definition of Nuclear Hegemony can be applied and refined in
academia. There are three unstable regions where China and Russia are competing in the
nuclear energy market: Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Iran.
As Parameswaran notes, Pakistan is China’s first nuclear importer. Meanwhile,
Russia has been exporting its own technology to India. (Sengupta & Ponangi, 2022) In a
region marked by “rivalries and deteriorating relationships” between India and Pakistan
(Rupert, 2022) and border disputes between China and India, (Singh, 2022) instability in the
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region threatens not only nuclear facilities but other infrastructure projects. Of particular
interest is how the India-Pakistan rivalry could have a ripple effect on its hegemons,
particularly if the nuclear projects of one hegemon are threatened by the activities of the
other’s client state. How Nuclear Hegemony functions in the interplay
cooperative/competitive dynamic of three BRICS members is also a topic that invites more
research.
Kazakhstan is a critical source of uranium in Russia’s Supply Chain and a participant
in the BRI. Given its geographical position and its endowment of resources, it could serve as
a uniting force between Russia and China, or it could drive a wedge between the two. (BurkeWhite, 2022) An interesting angle to explore would be the potential bidirectionality of
Nuclear Hegemony, where a perceived client state could leverage its advantages over a
hegemon.
Iran is another area for further study of Nuclear Hegemony. According to Feldman &
Lavi, Iran is an important geopolitical partner not only for Russia, which built a nuclear
reactor in Bushehr, but also for China, which has aspirations to penetrate more Middle
Eastern markets. Although Mahmoud Abbaszadeh-Meshkin, spokesman for the Iranian
parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, was quoted in January of 2022
as saying that “a triangle consisting of three powers – Iran, Russia, and China” had formed in
Asia, (Sinaee, 2022) the RANE network (2015), predicts that Iran could, in fact, become “the
first battleground between China and Russia in terms of nuclear exports.” Tanchum (2015)
notes that Rosatom’s nuclear monopoly in Iran, which is now being threatened by China’s
entry into the market, is in various stages of agreement with other countries in the Middle
East, including signing a bilateral agreement with Iran’s enemy, Saudi Arabia. These three
areas represent a different geopolitical context to apply our definition of Nuclear Hegemony.
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How the hegemons interact with each other in unstable areas in the face of more direct
competition can add deeper dimensions to our definition.
The Financing dimension of Nuclear Hegemony is clearly under Russian and Chinese
capture, and the U.S. and western states do not currently have the competitive capacity to
leverage influence unilaterally. One solution postulated by Baker, Fitzpatrick, and Goldberg
is co-financing nuclear projects by OECD states such as the U.S., Canada, the UK, France,
Japan, and Korea. Collectively, these states could competitively fund nuclear projects. Many
have noted that the west is far behind Russia and China in nuclear capacity. Under a new
form of nuclear cooperation, a supply chain could be developed leveraging Canada and
Japan’s uranium capacities (WNA, 2021; 2022g) for fuel, accelerating American, French, and
Japanese cooperation in the deployment of advanced reactors, such as the Economic
Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR), and the Advanced Pressurized-Water Reactor,
and accelerating development and deployment of SMRs such as the American-designed
NuScale reactor. (ANS, 2013) Such a strategy reduces financial liability, is more transparent,
and assuages safety concerns.
From a Nuclear Hegemonic perspective, this raises three future research questions to
be answered: 1. Will western Nuclear Hegemony re-emerge in a classic model vis-à-vis one
state dominating supply chains? Or will they adopt a more liberal or constructivist approach?
2. How will partnering states interact with each other? 3. How would a re-emergent
hegemonic west shape energy geopolitics vis-à-vis Russia and China?
Finally, there are many opportunities to challenge, amend and expand our definition
of Nuclear Hegemony. This study deliberately avoided considerations of nuclear weapons
because much time and effort have already been put toward the hegemonic aspect of nuclear
weapons. However, scholars should conduct a comparative analysis of the energy and
weapons aspects of Nuclear Hegemony. Our analysis thus far has already established that
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coercion is a latent aspect of any hegemonic relationship, including Nuclear Hegemony as
defined in this work. Medhurst has suggested that American civilian nuclear exports under
the Atoms for Peace program were nothing more than an attempt to obscure the U.S.’s goal to
nuclearize allies against the Soviets. Contemporary analysis of modern nuclear technology
has raised concerns that advanced nuclear technologies are capable of being weaponized. For
example, the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) is reportedly capable of generating
enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce 1,270 nuclear warheads by 2030. (Sokoloski,
2021) In 2018 Nguyen reported China’s intention to build and deploy up to 20 floating NPPs
throughout the South China Sea to “support China’s offshore oil and gas exploration, as well
as to sustain the Chinese civilian presence.” Given the sparse population of the islands in the
region, he states that 20 NPPs are “unjustifiable if only for civil facilities.” Instead, he
suggests, the NPPs will be used to “solidify China’s military foothold in this contested area”
by powering her regional infrastructure” to guard against attack. If, therefore, nuclear
weapons and energy go hand in hand, as it were, a logical next step in developing our
definition of Nuclear Hegemony may be to synthesize its weapons and energy aspects,

CONCLUSION
This paper sought to develop a more refined definition of Nuclear Hegemony as it
pertains to energy geopolitics. From the perspective of a looming potential global energy
security crisis exacerbated by the geopolitical instability in Ukraine, coupled with the critical
need to reduce carbon emissions, many western states who had previously retreated from the
nuclear energy sector are now reconsidering revisiting the technology to meet increasing
energy demand.
Most scholarly work on the hegemonic dimensions of nuclear energy frames them
within a realist coercive context reflective of Cold War politics. However, the geopolitical
landscape is dramatically changing as the rising influences of Russia, China, and other non-
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aligned countries coincide with declining western dominance. These actors have the political
and economic capacity to pursue their interests on their terms outside the Western
governance established at the end of World War II. Russia and China have developed robust
nuclear power industries, which they are eager to export to developing countries that need
reliable, low-carbon energy solutions. This gives Russia and China an opportunity to
establish a foothold in these countries and leverage their nuclear capacity to exert influence to
alter the trajectory of the current world order.
This warrants a new definition of Nuclear Hegemony that focuses on energy
geopolitics. By establishing an overall concept of hegemony that seeks to explain how more
endowed states leverage their political and economic advantage to influence the behavior of
less endowed states, case studies of the IAEA and Russian, Chinese, and American nuclear
programs enabled us to conceive our definition of Nuclear Hegemony as “The leveraging of
technological and financial nuclear capacities in energy generation by preponderant states
over acquiescent states by establishing a system of dependency, encapsulating supply chain,
and financing mechanisms, over a multi-decadal time frame to exercise geopolitical power
and influence.”
The intersectionality of Dependency and Time in Nuclear Hegemony represents a
profound dynamic in the current geopolitical environment marked by Chinese and Russian
nuclear export competition and Western attempts to reclaim leadership in nuclear
governance.
For the foreseeable future, nuclear energy will play a part in energy geopolitics. How
it will shape the future of geopolitics and who will emerge as the hegemon (or hegemons)
remains to be seen. While the implications of a realist, coercive relationship are implied, it is
essential to consider the liberal and constructivist aspects of Nuclear Hegemony for academic
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purposes. It is hoped that this definition will be helpful to scholars in further analysis of
geopolitical nuclear relationships.
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